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ABSTRACT 
 
The establishment of Islamic political parties in the reform era in Indonesia after the 
fall of Suharto (1998), considered as resurgence of political stream. There are several 
factors that led to the revival of Islamic parties after the New Order, the theological 
factor, historical, sociological, and reform factor. The presence of Islamic political 
parties after the New Order was apparently diverse and fragmented. In  the political 
elite of Islam itself in establishing a political party based on Islam and there is also 
based on nationality, and in establishing political party was using substantially 
approach and there is also that use formalistic approach. In the reform era elections, 
political Islam has failed, in which Islamic parties do not receive optimal support from 
voters Islam. The failure of Islamic parties in election of reform era is caused of factor 
among Muslims has been change the orientation of political views. Islamic parties in 
the reform era stuck in a political myth quantity, and Islamic parties are also 
fragmented and fractured in to small forces. 
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Journey of Islamic parties in Indonesia after independence began with Masyumi establishment. Two 
major Islamic organizations, Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah are the pioneer of 
Masyumi establishment, November 1945. It was agreed that Masjumi as the sole forum for 
channeling the aspiration and struggle of Muslims in Indonesia. But in the way, one by one Masyumi 
supporting element began to leave and set up his own political party. July 1947, PSII (Partai 
Syarikat Islam Indonesia) left Masyumi and redeclared as an independent political party. Traces of 
PSII was followed by NU. In 1952, NU was declared out of the Masjumi and proclaimed as a political 
party as NU Party. In addition, there was other Islamic party dominate in Sumatra; Perti 
(Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah). 
During parliamentary democracy, the role of Islamic parties coloring democracy and 
governance. Islamic parties are indispensable part in the formation of the cabinet. Each cabinet 
formation, the Islamic parties are key element in forming the coalition government. The 1955 
election, which is the first election after independence of Indonesia, six Islamic parties were 
contestant, Masyumi, NU, PSII, Perti, Partai Pesartuan Tharikah Islam (PPTI), and AKUI. 1955 
Election result showed Islamic parties did not obtain majority vote. Masyumi gained 20.9% vote, 
NU gained 18.4% vote, PSII gained 2.0% vote, Perti gained 1.3% vote, PPTI and AKUI each gained 
0.2% vote (Feith 1957: 58). Entered a period of Guided Democracy, Islamic parties are forced to 
support the Nasakom ideology. As a result, Islamic parties split become two, a group that supports 
the ideology Nasakom that is represented by NU and those who oppose, that is  represented by 
Masyumi. NU entered the circle of power for supporting the ideology Nasakom Soekarno, while 
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Masyumi, for refusing, then dissolved by Sukarno in 1960. With the dissolution of the political 
power of Islam, Masyumi practically excluded from the arena of power.  For, although NU is in the 
circle of power, it has no role and no power. Observers assume that  NU accept Nasakom ideology as 
opportunistic political stance (Deliar Noer 1987). When the New Order appeared holding the reins of 
power, the Muslims have great expectations, which will appear back Masyumi. The hope turned out 
it was just a hope. Because the regime did not allow Masjumi back as a political party. Instead, the 
regime allowed the establishment of Parmusi. The establishment is also with a note: figures ex-
Masyumi prohibited from engaging in the management of the party (Ali & Bakhtiar 1986: 108). 
Government action did not stop there. For reason of political stability as a prerequisite of economic 
development, the New Order then restructure the party system. With this policy, the Islamic parties 
(Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia or Parmusi, NU, PSII and Perti) and other parties (Partai Nasional 
Indonesia or PNI, Partai Katolik, Partai Kristen Indonesia or Parkindo, and Ikatan Pendukung 
Kemederkaan Indonesia or IPKI) forced to perform fusion. Four Islamic parties,  Parmusi, NU, PSII 
and Perti join in PPP (United Development Party). Thus, PPP is the only Muslim political power. 
 The process of marginalization of New Order regime against political Islam apparently 
continues, by issued “deideologizing” policy. In this policy, the political parties are not allowed to 
use other principle than the principle of Pancasila. As a result of the policy, the political parties have 
no other choice. PPP Finally, as the last bastion of Muslim political power, removed and replaced 
Islamic principles to be Pancasila principles. Likewise with the symbol of “Kaaba” was changed to 
“Star”, in 1985. Star emblem is a symbol of Pancacila first precepts contained in the “body Garuda 
Pancasila”.  Substitution PPP ideology and symbol, according to Nasir Tamara, a process of political 
“deislamization” and “depoliticization” of Islam. After the PPP as the only representation of  
political Islam forces have stripped the principles of Islam and accepted the principle of Pancasila, 
historian Taufik Abdullah said that the PPP accept Pancasila as the principle that it is “last page of 
political Islam in Indonesia” (Tamara 1988). Post-New Order Indonesia, due to the reform 
movement spearheaded by Santri, has been an explosion of political participation. The explosion of 
political participation was not only affects the future of grass roots but also attacked the political 
elite. As an embodiment of the explosion of political participation, political elites competing to set 
up or revive political parties, including the establishment of Islamic parties. In this brief article, try 
to explain the phenomenon of the establishment of Islamic parties in Indonesia, the reform era and 
how its strength in elections. 
  
Revival of Islamic Political Party 
 
The establishment of Islamic political parties in the reform era in Indonesia after the fall of Suharto 
(1998), considered as resurgence of political stream. This is because in the past, the New Order did 
“dealirinisasi” (removal of various political ideology) policy with series of policies such as: the 
”depoliticization” of the masses, floating mass, and “deideologizing” by imposing Pancasila as the 
sole basis.  After the fall of the New Order, political affiliations, especially religious, revival with a 
form of the establishment Islamic political parties. 
 To understand the revival of Islamic political parties Indonesia’s reform era can be 
approximated by the political stream. In Indonesia, political stream is introduced by Clifford Geertz, 
based on his research results in Mojokuto. In his book Religion of Java, he developed into a religious 
social grouping schismatic ideology socio-cultural and politic. Based on that, Geertz then developed 
variants Islamic community in Java over three variants, namely abangan, santri, and the aristocracy.  
The three variants represent different cultures. Abangan represent animistic culture and 
syncretism, santri focus on aspects of orthodox Islam, and the aristocracy emphasize aspects of 
Hindu-Buddhist (Abdullah 1987: 2). Geertz classification was criticized by experts, including W. 
Harsya Bachtiar. According to him, the classification society Geertz on Javanese Islam on three 
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variants have no loyalty principle. Varian abangan and santri refers to the understanding of 
religion, while the aristocracy refers to social status. Thus the term aristocracy is not the same 
category with abangan and santri. Because there is aristocracy who obey religion, so he is called the 
santri. And there is aristocracy who does not adhere to religion, as he is called abangan (Bachtiar 
1981: 525). 
 Santri-abangan dichotomy is expressed well by Robert R. Jay. In his writing : “Religion and 
Politics in Central Java Rural” (Jay 1963), Jay describes the relationship between Islam and Javaism 
schismatic, which later evolved beyond the area of religious confrontation and entered politics.  
Historically, according to Jay, the emergence of santri-abangan begins on Islamization in Java at the 
time of the Mataram kingdom. At that time, Islam was accepted as a religion, but it has been 
“domesticated or harmonized” with the aristocratic class tastes. The presence of Islam abangan and 
santri due process of Islamization in Java running uneven. There are areas of intensive experience 
in the process of Islamization of boarding center, forming a group of orthodox Islam. The regions 
are low-intensity Islamization and far from the centers of Islamic boarding schools then formed 
abangan (Dhofier 1978: 65). Dichotomy of santri-abangan went beyond the religious. They have 
different political orientations, which then led to dispute and conflict in the form of political, 
ideological, and class. Dispute mainly occurs in the context of the relation between religion and 
state. According to Victor Tanja, abangan group support idea of a total separation of religion from 
politic (Tanja 1982: 23). Instead of the santri argued that religion and politic should be united. In 
the political field, the abangan are followers of the secular nationalists and even communist. Their 
political orientation channeled through the secular parties, such as the Indonesian National Party 
(PNI) and Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). While the santri are supporters of Islamic parties, 
Masyumi and NU. 
 According to Donald K. Emmerson, although the followers of Islam in Indonesia is majority, 
santri political cultural  is minority. While abangan political culture is the majority. Political elite 
abangan more dominant in comparison with the political elite santri (Emmerson 1976: 28). The 
role of the dominant political elite abangan can be seen in the bureaucracy and the legislature. 
From colonial times, the political elite abangan more dominant than the political elite santri.  
Differences between groups abangan political orientation and santri are then reflected in the state 
debate in the Constituent Assembly. The first group, a strong supporter of the state Pancasila, and 
therefore rejects the basic Islamic state. The second group is a supporter of the state of Islam, and 
therefore rejects the state Pancasila. 
 Thus, in terms of the political culture, the problems faced is the creation of a meeting point 
between the political elite santri and the political elite abangan. Two forms of political culture are 
competing with each other so does not reach a consensus (Feith 1968: 30-31). According 
Kuntowijoyo, santri and abangan cultural dichotomy is now over. The process of change begins 
dichotomy abangan and santri since the introduction of religious education in public schools. Thus, 
practically abangan children get the same basis of religious education. Meanwhile, the development 
of public education in Islamic boarding schools have eliminated the cultural exclusivism among 
santri (Kuntowijoyo 1998). I would argue that the changes are merely sociological. Sociologically 
convergence has occurred between abangan and santri. However, politically and ideologically, I 
think no change significantly. Despite, abangan who being santri, their political orientation and 
ideology has not changed. They still support the ideas of secularism in the political and religious 
life. 
 Th. Sumartana (1998) said some things that lead to the emergence of political parties based 
on religion. First, because religion itself has theological support to achieve the goals based on 
religious ideas believed. Second, because of the political ties of the citizens led to religion as a factor 
binding to support the leader of the religious group.  Third, because religious people are feeling 
International Journal of Islamic Thought   
Vol. 4: (Dec.) 2013 
 
 
40 
more comfortable with the political leaders who were born from their own community and 
disbelief when politics dominated by other religious groups. 
There are several factors that led to the revival of Islamic parties after the New Order, the 
theological factor, historical, sociological, and reform factor. First, the theological. Unlike 
Christianity in looking at the relationship between religion and the state, which the two are 
separate areas. Religion is a private matter in a relationship with God. While the state is a public 
matter that should not be interfered by religious issues. There are three views of the relationship 
between religion and the state, namely: integrated, symbiotic mutualism and secularists. The 
existence or the presence of Islamic political parties associated with the first view, the unity of 
religion and state (integrated).  In this view, religion is something that is Integrated, which are 
inseparably connected. Islam is din wa daulah, as well as the state religion or politics. Second, 
sociological factor. Islam is the majority religion in Indonesia. The adherent is about 90% of the 
total population of Indonesia. With the majority, it is appropriate to effort the distribution of 
political aspiration accordance with Islamic values and  struggle. The existence of Islamic political 
parties regarded as the aspiration of the Islamic struggle organization. Thus, the establishment of 
the Islamic political party is a necessity that cannot be circumvented: sociologically Muslims in 
Indonesia are majority adherent, and they will feel comfortable and safe when the distribution of 
their political aspiration  is through the Islamic political party. This sociological context seems to be 
used by Islamic political elites to establish an Islamic political party. With the majority of Muslims 
would get the support of Muslims. The existence of Islamic political parties will automatically be 
backed up by Muslims. Moreover, coupled with a theological perspective, where the need for a 
means of struggle to realize the aspirations of Islam so that the sociological and theological factors 
met: complement and support one another. Third, historical factor. In the history of Islam in 
Indonesia is a force that was instrumental in the fight against the colonialist. Islam in those days 
was one of the frontline in ousting the colonialist. In order to oust the colonialist was necessary to 
have an organization as unifying  aspiration and goal. Then it’s recorded, the establishment of 
Sarekat Islam (SI), as the first organization of political power that has the most members among the 
other movement organizations. When Indonesia became independent, the establishment of 
Masyumi becomes a dealer Muslim aspirations. Followed by the establishment of  other Islamic 
parties, i.e. PSII, NU and Perti. Fourth, reform factor. The reform that is initiated by santri in 
toppling the regime spawn an era of freedom. In this era, any group or groups are given the 
opportunity to channel or form political party in accordance with principles and its political 
aspirations. This opportunity seems is not wasted by the political elites, including the Islamic 
political elites to form political parties. As discussed earlier, the Islamic political parties established 
like mushrooms in rainy season. 
The presence of Islamic political parties after the New Order was apparently diverse and 
fragmented. In fact not only that, in the political elite of Islam itself in establishing a political party 
based on Islam and there is also based on nationality. Islamic political elites in establishing political 
party were using substantially approach and there is also that use formalistic approach.  The first 
approach, substantially, in founding a political party, which although base of Muslims, but the 
ideology based on nationalism and plural. Political parties such as National Mandate Party (PAN) 
and the National Awakening Party (PKB), for example, are models of substantially approach.  While 
the latter approach, formalistic, establish political parties by using symbol, names, and principles of 
Islam. Islamic elites formalistic approach, in establishing an Islamic party is not all based on the 
principles of Islam, but there is a political party based on the principles of Islam and Pancasila, and 
political party based on the principles of Pancasila. Thus, viewed from the usage of the principle 
there are three groups of Islamic parties, namely: Islamic party based on Islam; Islamic Party based 
on Islam and Pancasila, and; Islamic party based on  Pancasila. List the three types of parties can be 
seen in the Table 1: 
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Table 1: Islamic Parties Based on Islam 
 
No. Party Ideology Chairman 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Partai Persatuan Pembanguan (PPP) 
Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB) 
Partai Keadilan (PK) 
Partai Umat Islam (PUI) 
Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII) 
Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII) 1905 
Partai Ka’bah 
Partai Dua Syahadat (PDS) 
Partai Daulat Umat (PDU) 
Partai Demokrasi Islam Republik Indonesia (PADRI) 
Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama (PKNU) 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Islam 
Hamzah Haz 
Yusril Ihza Mahendra 
Hidayat Nur Wahid 
Deliar Noer 
Taufik Tjokroaminoto 
Ohan Sudjana 
Achmad Suhaemi 
KH. Mukarta 
Bambang Widyatomo 
Heri Iskandrsyah 
R.Idris Tamami 
 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
 
20 
Partai Abul Yatama (PAY) 
Partai Masyumi Baru (PMB) 
Partai Nahdlatul Ummat (PNU) 
Partai Kebangkutan Umat (PKU) 
Partai Pengamal Thariqat Islam 
Partai Persatuan Thariqat Islam 
Partai Kebangkitan Muslim Indonesia (Partai KAMI) 
Partai Kebangkitan Kaum Ahlus Sunah Wal Jama'ah 
(PAKKAM) 
Partai Era Reformasi Tarbiyah Islamiyah (PERTI) 
Islam and Pancasila 
Islam and Pancasila 
Islam and Pancasila 
Islam and Pancasila 
Islam and Pancasila 
Islam and Pancasila 
Islam and Pancasila 
 
Islam and Pancasila 
Islam and Pancasila 
Rusli Bintang 
Ridwan Saidi 
KH. Sukron Makmun 
KH. Yusup Hasyim 
Masykur Loamena 
Syech St Muchtar Doyah  
Syamsahril 
 
Sjarkawi Machudum 
HST Sukarnotomo 
 
21 
 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Partai Aliansi Kebangkitan Muslim Sunny (Partai 
AKAMSI) 
Partai Politik Tharikat Indonesia  
Partai Solidaritas Uni Nasional Indonesia (Partai SUNI)  
Partai Ummat Muslimin Indonesia (PUMI)  
Partai Bhakti Muslim (PBM) 
Partai Indonesia Baru (PIB) 
Partai Islam Demokrat (PID) 
Partai Islam Persatuan Indonesia (PIPI) 
Partai Kesatuan Ummat Indonesia (PKUI) 
Partai Persatuan Sabilillah (PPS) 
Pancasila 
 
Pancasila 
Pancasila 
Pancasila 
Pancasila 
Pancasila 
Pancasila 
Pancasila 
Pancasila 
Pancasila 
KH. Sofyan Siradj 
 
Rahman Sabon 
Abu Hasan 
KH. Anwar Junus 
Ibnu Hasyim Lubis 
HM. Syaiful Anwar 
Andi Rasyid Jalil 
HM. Dault 
Zakiruddin 
Herman Sastrawinata 
 
 
Islamic Political Parties and Electoral Reform Era 
 
One of the demands of the reform movement is the elections that are accelerated. This is because 
the peoples' representatives in the House/Assembly are Election 1997 result, considered 
illegitimate and part of the New Order regime. In addition, the 1997 election was won by Golkar 
that is engineered by the New Order regime that doing manipulation and intimidation. Because of 
that, the results of the 1997 elections are considered illegitimate. Instead it is necessary to re-
election that is democratic, fair, and overflow (direct, general, free and secret). Under these 
conditions, the Electoral Act 1998 which came out accelerate the election. By embracing the 
proportional system, then set the election was held on June 6, 1999. There were 48 political parties 
that qualify for the 1999 elections. Of those amounts, 17 of which are Islamic political party. They 
are: PPP, PBB, PK, PP, PUI, PMB, PPI Masyumi, PID, PIB, PSII, PSII 1905, PNU, PKU, Partai SUNI, 
Partai KAMI, PAY, and PUMI. 
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 Election 1999 is the moment to prove whether the Islamic parties will gain the support of 
their constituents, i.e. Muslims reach 90% of the total population of Indonesia (120 million people).  
This is because in this election, battles between political forces to gain the electoral participants 
voice. In this context, each of the participants or contestants try to influence the election and appeal 
to the masses by offering programs and promises for a new post-New Order Indonesia. Generally, 
there are five political forces which fought in the 1999 elections, i.e. the political power of Islamic 
parties; the political power of parties base of Islamic mass;  secular nationalist political forces; the 
political power of democratic socialism, and; the political power of the Christian groups. In order to 
deal with these forces, Islamic parties joined by doing stembuss accord (incorporation of residual 
vote). With stembuss accord is expected political parties votes of Islamic constituents not lost.  But 
unfortunately, not all the Islamic parties  joined in stembuss accord,only nine of  the 17 parties 
contesting the election. The nine Islamic parties are: PPP, PBB, PK, PKU, PNU, PSII, 1905, and PPI 
Masyumi. The results of the 1999 elections showed the vote of Islamic parties fell away. From 17 
Islamic parties, only PPP to be the top five, gaining 10.72% votes (59 seats).  While most of the 
other Islamic parties did not gain significant vote to achieve any seats in Parliament. Crescent Star 
Party (PBB), which is considered as the main heir of Masyumi only won 1.9% of the vote or 13 
seats, while the Party of Justice (PK) only able to collect 1.4% vote (7 seats). Several other Islamic 
parties like Nahdlatul Ummah Party (PNU), Unity Party (PP), Syarikat Islamic Party of Indonesia 
(PSII), Islamic Political Party of Indonesia Masyumi (PPI Masyumi), and the National Awakening 
Party People (PKU) only gained one seat each. A number of other Islamic parties are not able to 
garner support for a seat in Parliament. 
 Appeal of Majelis Ulama Indonesia or Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) and Islamic elites to 
choose Islamic parties and should not vote for parties that non-Muslim majority figures ignored by 
the masses of Islam, especially Islamic mass grassroots. The enthusiasm of Islamic leaders who are 
very confident in the ability win a majority of the population of the country with each claim will be 
supported by a lot of Muslims is not proven. The Development Unity Party (PPP), for example, 
believes will be able to maintain the gains achieved in his vote as the 1997 elections, amounting to 
22%. While PK believe will be voted about 10-15% (Umar 1999): 
 
Table 2: Vote and Chairs Acquisition of Islamic Political Party in 1999 Elections 
 
No Political Party Vote % Chair 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) 
Partai Bulan Bintang (PBR) 
Partai Keadilan (PK) 
Partai Nahdlatul Umat (PNU) 
Partai Persatuan (PP) 
Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi (PPI 
Masyumi) 
Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII) 
Partai Kebangkitan Umat (PKU) 
Partai Kebangkitan Muslim Indonesia (KAMI) 
Partai Ummat Islam (PUI) 
Partai Abul Yatama (PAY) 
Partai Indonesia Baru (PIB) 
Partai Solidaritas Uni Nasional Indonesia 
(Partai SUNI) 
PSII 1905 
Partai Masyumi Baru (PMB) 
Partai Islam Demokrat (PID) 
Partai Ummat Muslimin Indonesia (PUMI) 
11.329.905 
2.049.708 
        1.436.565 
           679.179 
            551.028 
456.718 
 
375.920 
300.064 
289.489 
269.309 
213.979 
192.712 
180.167 
 
152.820 
152.589 
  62.901 
  49.839 
10.72 
1.94 
1.36 
0.64 
0.52 
0.43 
 
0.36 
0.28 
0.27 
0.25 
0.20 
0.18 
0.17 
 
0.14 
0.14 
0.06 
0.05 
58 
13 
7 
5 
1 
1 
 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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 As shown in the table above, the majority of Islamic parties failed. Tally support of Islamic 
parties is very little. Thus, the claims raised by the elite that Islamic parties will be supported by the 
people just a figment. PKB, as a nationalist-religious parties, and PAN as a pluralist party, each 
gaining 12.6%  votes and 7.1%. Actually winning parties had been previously suspected. Instead 
pluralist secular parties much popular support. PDI-P as the secular party came out as the winner 
with 33.8% gaining votes (153 seats), followed by the Golkar Party get votes 22.5% (120 seats) 
(Kazhim et al. 1999). In facing the 2004 elections, which is Indonesia’s second election after the 
reform, not all Islamic political parties could be a contestant. This happens because most Islamic 
parties did not pass verification as electoral participants. Some Islamic parties into electoral 
participants were forced to change the name because of the 1999 election does not pass electoral 
threshold, include the Justice Party (PK) turns into the Wellfare & Justice Party (PKS). Unless the 
PKS, the results of the 2004 elections, both parties are Muslim and Islamic mass-based the vote 
dropped. In fact, the PBB passes in the 1999 election threshold (ET). The National Mandate Party 
(PAN), which despite its chairperson has been working hard and sweaty does not seem to affect 
anything. Instead of going up the vote, it was drastic diminution of 6.4% (the 1999 elections, gained 
7.1%). The decline of PAN is related to the inconsistency that is exhibited by Amien Rais. As a 
reformist, he is often inconsistent in statement, for example, in terms of the idea of a federal state 
and his attitude towards the military leadership. In addition, Amien Rais is known by people, like 
talk a lot, one thing that is not liked by the people of Indonesia who psychological likes silence and a 
lot of work. Another factor is something that is considered wrong by the masses when he dropped 
Gus Dur president, while he who carries Gus Dur to become president in an effort to dead lock 
between Megawati or BJ. Habibie as president. The PPP and The PBB also suffered the same. Two 
Islamic parties that carry Islamic law seems less enthused by masses of Islam itself plus the issue of 
internal conflict that gave birth some new political parties from both parties. As a result of this 
conflict, born from the “womb” of PPP, Reform PPP and PBR (Reform Star Party  or Partai Bintang 
Reformasi) and the Reform of the PBB was born Partai Al-Islam Sejahtera (PAS) and Partai Islam 
Indonesia (PII). Suspected, the supporters of the two parties switched to PKS, which was 
considered quite consistent and clean as the Islamic party. PKS gaining (7.34%) votes due to the 
hard work has done. Using dual tactics, on the one hand as a party that carries Islam and the other 
with alignment program to the people, honest, clean, and care that is demonstrated through 
concrete actions, which is not only promises, ultimately foster sympathy and support of the masses 
to pick PKS. Masses that support PKS are those that need party actually works, not only selling 
promises. The issues raised by the PKS are anti corruption, rule of law, anti rotten politicians, 
touching the hearts of people so that they decided to throw in the PKS: 
 
Table 3: Acquisition of Islamic Political Party and Based Islamic Mass  Election Results 1999, 2004 and 2009 
 
No Name of Party 1999 Election 2004 Election 2009 Election 
1 Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) 1.4% 7.34% 7.88% 
2 Partai Amanat Nasional  (PAN) 7.1% 6.44% 6.01% 
3 Partai Persatuan Pembangunan  (PPP) 10.7% 8.15% 5.32% 
4 Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) 12.6% 10.57% 4.94% 
5 Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB) 1.94% 2.62% 1.79% 
6 Partai Bintang Reformasi (PBR) - 2.44% 1.21% 
7 Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah 
Indonesia (PPNUI) 
0.64% 0.79% 0.14% 
8 Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama 
(PKNU) 
  1.47% 
9 Partai Matahari Bangsa (PMB)   0.40% 
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Declination of Electoral Strength of Islamic Party in the 2009 Election 
 
In facing the 2009 election, it predicts a slowdown in gaining votes. Indo Barometer, for example, in 
a survey conducted in June 2008 is predicted the acquisition of Islamic Party is relatively small. 
Based on the survey, the acquisition of PKS at the position 7.2%, while  the PPP is at 2.3% position. 
A survey conducted by the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) on February 8 to February 18, 2009, 
also showed that the number of Islamic party vote is predicted to decline in the 2009 election. In 
this context, Bachtiar Effendy said that Islamic parties can not appear as the ruling party like a 
secular-based parties such as Golkar Party, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), or the 
Democratic Party (PD). Because, he said, Islam  political party  area is limited. Islamic parties often 
bring old issues, such as the application of the syariat, the establishment of an Islamic state, and the 
president of the Islamic religion. He further said that after the 1955 election, support of Islamic 
parties continue to decline (Hasil Survei 2006). The results of the 2009 election shows that the 
predictions of the pollsters are not much different. Islamic parties remain middle party and 
decreasing. As shown in the table above, except for the PKS, all Islamic political parties and Islamic 
mass-based decline. Even five political parties do not qualify for Parliamentary Threshold (PT) 
2,5%, ie: Crescent Star Party (PBB), Reform Star Party  (PBR), Ulema National Awakening Party 
(PKNU), National Sun Party  (PMB), and Nahdatul Ummah Unity Party of Indonesia (PPNUI). 
PPP as old party, in the 2009 election was not able to maintain its vote. PPP acquisition has 
declined significantly, from 8.15% in the 2004 election to 5.32% in the 2009 election. Thus, it has 
decreased by about three percent of the 2004 election. The decline of PPP is because this New 
Order legacy Party is often plagued by internal conflict and a lack of decent sales figures. Although 
there are two PPP cadres who sat in the cabinet, ie Bachtiar Hasyah as Social Minister and Surya 
Dharma Ali as Minister of Cooperatives and UKM (Small and medium businesses), seem could not 
be magnetised to collect support. Instead to raise PPP, both of them seem likely “busy” feuding and 
conflict. PBB got the vote in the 2004 election around 2.62%, in the 2009 election has decreased 
dramatically, reaching only 1.79%. Although PBB is relatively free of conflict, it seems that after the 
death of Yusril Ihza Mahendra who no longer serves as Chairman of PBB and was replaced by MS 
Kaban, PBB does not have an icon and prestige. PBB tends to sink into the political map along with 
the Yusril resignation of Justice Minister. By not passing in the House, observers predict could be 
Masyumi “dynasty” will be immersed in national politics. The same fate also experienced by PBR 
that reach 1.21%. The party that was born out of PPP internal conflict, in the 2004 elections with 
KH Zaenuddin MZ as an icon, the same fate with the PBB, which is equally qualified PT. After the 
death of a million clerics Ummah, PBR seems no longer have a central figure that is worth selling, so 
degraded support. Conflict factor in PBR with release some of the PBR elite like Zaenal Maarif and 
Kh. Zaenudijn MZ contributed to deflate the PBR vote. Despite the efforts made by the leader of 
PBR, Bursah Zarnubi, by recruiting young people and among activists apparently still not able to 
achieve significant mass support. PKNU is a new Islamic party product of PKB internal conflict. 
Under the command of Khaerul Anam and “help birth” by Kyai Langitan, less Nahdiyin give support 
to PKNU. Rather than beat PKB, PKNU also not escaped PT. It seems clerics charismatic 
experiencing “crisis effect”; with low levels of vote support obtained by PKNU. Whereas in the body 
PKNU not a few clerics who enter into it. The same fate also experienced by PMB, which did not 
qualify for PT. Despite carrying Din Syamsuddin as a presidential candidate and claims as the 
biological child of Muhammadiyah, still he was not able to attract massive constituents of 
Muhammadiyah. Muhammadiyah mass seems most still support PAN. This is because Amin Rais is 
still behind the PAN.  
Vote declining occurs not only to Islamic parties, Parties with Islam base also decreased, 
namely PAN and PKB. PAN in the 2004 elections gained 6.44%, in the 2009 election decreased to 
6.01%. Whereas to deal 2009 election, the party under the leadership Sutrisno Bachir nominating 
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several artists as PAN candidates as vote getters and sound panners. Apparently the result was not 
much change. PAN leadership post Rais seems to miss the central figure as an attraction and “worth 
selling”. PMB Founding is a factor that is also undermining vote of PAN. While PKB, after internal 
conflict with the establishment of PKNU and releasing of Gus Dur from PKB under the leadership of 
Muhaimin Iskandar, vote gaining also fells sharply, from 10.57% to 4.94%. Decreased PKB vote has 
been predicted, because the absence of Gus Dur as PKB icon with charisma and his loyal masses, the 
party that was born from the womb of NU would lose the central figure which has been a magnet 
for PKB. Almost the same as Partai Demokrat (PD) and Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan 
(PDIP), PKB is also identified with the figure, the figure of Gus Dur. So when Gus Dur leave PKB, PKB 
becomes unsteady, loss its loyal supporters. Islamic Party which rose its vote, though slightly from 
7.34 percent to 7.88 percent is PKS. PKS voting is relatively stable, not declining, one explanatory 
factor is sustainable regeneration. If PKS vote in the 2004 election is from the swing voters, in the 
2009 elections is majority vote comes from the PKS cadres and sympathizers of PKS. They of course 
still come from the mass base of Islamic parties. The phenomenon “predatorism” or “cannibalism” 
among Islamic parties in this case is still relevant. 
 It can be concluded that, the failure of Islamic parties in election of reform era is caused by 
factor, first, among Muslims has been changing the orientation of political views. As a result of the 
government modernization and reform movement spearheaded by Nurcholis Madjid, impacts to 
the views of Muslims who are no longer bound by the symbols of Islamization.  People no longer see  
Islamic party as a representative to Islamization, but had seen the extent of a party to apply to the 
values of Islamization. So the emphasis by the people was substantial but not formalism. They do 
not see what the label that is used by a party but rather to see how far a party fight, for example, on 
democratization, human rights, transparency, and so on. Islamic parties in the reform era stuck in a 
political myth quantity. The view that the majority of Indonesia population is Muslims, they will 
choose Islamic parties. The myth is not up to the reality. The history of elections proves that 
Muslims support for Islamic parties is small. Reality shows that not all Muslims in Indonesia are 
ideological. Facts show that Muslims in Indonesia tend to be sociological. Following Geetz typology, 
that the Muslims of Indonesia was a devout, called the santri and there are Muslims who are less 
devout or nominal Muslims, called abangan. The last certainly did not vote for a party because they 
have viewed that religion must separate from political affairs. Deliar Noer wrote that there were 
four Muslim groups, namely: (1) group of people who are committed to Islam; (2) group that want 
to cooperate with authorities, (3) those who view Islam as “the only teaching”, and (4) group that 
does not want to associate Islam as a religion with politics (Noer 1988). Islamic parties are also 
fragmented and fractured into smaller forces. As it’s known in the reform era, there are 32 Islamic 
parties, from the amount 17 parties basses. Of course this number very much. With many of these 
Islamic parties confuse Muslims. In addition to the fragmentation and fracturing of the Islamic 
parties with the party itself weaken Islam itself as a political force. 
It also can be said that the failure of Islamic parties relates to the disarticulation of Islamic 
political thought and practice. The practitioner or Islamic politicians have sold something that is not 
needed by the public. The issues thrown less striking and biting, so it does not have an attraction 
for the public. Modernization project of New Order government, result secular pragmatic view 
among Muslims. As a result of the modernization occurred transformation socio-economic, 
especially among the middle class or educated. They are then shifted in political orientation, which 
was formalistic in looking at the relationship between religion and politic to be substantialistic 
where Islam is quite as ethical and moral guidance in the life of the nation and the state. With the 
failure of Islamic parties in elections in the reform era, the question arises: how is the future of 
political Islam? Is it still will survive and still have the support of Muslims. It’s hard to answer that 
question. But as a temporary response to the reality of the election results cited above in which the 
Islamic parties suffered a crushing defeat, it can be said that the future of political Islam in 
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Indonesia is not so promising.  Plummeting sound of Islamic parties or mass-based Muslims could 
be demonstrated that the political stream has faded, especially Islam. By decreasing Islamic parties 
vote in the 2009 election is a signal that the political stream is dead, as suggested by R. Willliam 
Liddle and Saiful Mujani. In their study they concluded that the political stream has faded (Muhtadi 
2009). However, it’s not too late  for the forces of political Islam taking steps toward consolidation. 
Division and fragmented forces of political Islam into the parties need to be addressed immediately.  
Among the Muslim political elites need better cooperation toward a solid strength. When the 
division and fragmented is not solved soon, history proves that political power is fragmented will 
not be effective in eliciting strength to win support from Muslims. 
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